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FABIAN RESEARCH

Quarterly Report

We hope that many more members, especially some of those who have recently joined, will offer to take part in the research work of the Society this winter. We should welcome any material or notes relevant to the work already in hand, and suggestions for further projects. Please send in your ideas to the Research Secretary, Joan Clarke, at the office.

HOME POLICY

Books

Social Security. The early chapters, consisting of a critical examination of existing services, are now in process of revision. They will lead up to a constructive plan which will form the latter part of the book.

Trade Associations. Professor Hermann Levy has now completed his work and we look forward to early publication.

A Policy for Post-Primary Education. Work on this is gradually getting under weigh.

PAMPHLETS AND TRACTS

In addition to those mentioned in the last issue, the following are in course of preparation: *Hospital Reorganisation*; *Concentration of the Wool Industry*; *Juvenile Delinquency*.

We are also contemplating a new Letter series of tracts addressed to particular professions. The first of these, *A Letter to an Industrial Manager*, by G. D. H. Cole, is in the press.

COLONIAL BUREAU

The last three months have been exceptionally busy and successful ones for the Bureau. The membership campaign, which opened with the publication of the first number of *Empire* under the auspices of the Bureau, has now got into full swing, and the number of the Bureau's supporters have mounted well

into the three figures. In July a highly successful week-end conference on *The Colonies, the War, and the Future* was held in Oxford. There was an attendance varying from 70 to 100 at most of the sessions, and a number of distinguished personalities, such as Professor Gilbert Murray, Sir Drummond Shiels, Sir Alan Pim, Sir Selwyn Grier, and Lord Faringdon, attended. The speakers also included A. Creech Jones M P, Prof. Macmillan, Miss Margaret Wrong, Miss Una Marson and Dr Rita Hinden. The conference has received a good deal of publicity in newspapers specially interested in colonial affairs, and was described in detail in a special broadcast to the West Indies in the B B C Empire service. Subscribers to *Empire* are also increasing. Articles have been reproduced and quoted in a number of places, and interest has been expressed among groups as widely divergent as missionary societies on the one side, and Divisional Labour Parties on the other.

The regular press and Parliamentary work of the Bureau is now becoming well-established. This work is aided by the increasing contacts which have been created with the colonies, and the steady stream of colonial newspapers and letters which is flowing in as a result. Owing to these contacts a fairly comprehensive news service is already proving its usefulness, not only directly in the work of the Bureau, but in giving information to a variety of other bodies and individuals.

On the research side, work is proceeding on the three books described in previous quarterly reports, and the first of these books will have seen the light of day by the time the next report appears. Very valuable work is also being done by a special labour committee consisting of a number of prominent British Trade Unionists and experts on international labour problems. This committee is making an intensive study of labour legislation and conditions in the colonies, and has already produced two valuable documents setting out its views on Trade Unionism in the colonies, and Colonial Labour Services. These documents are to be widely distributed among interested bodies, and will, it is hoped, eventually be published by the Society.

INTERNATIONAL BUREAU

The latest venture of the International Bureau has been the launching of a number of standing committees to work on various aspects of Labour's foreign policy. It is intended that these groups should be directed by 'experts' in their particular line, but should recruit as members anyone interested—and prepared to work. The groups are to study the implications of Labour's foreign policy, collect useful relevant material, and suggest lines

DEMOCRACY AFTER THE WAR

for action, now and later. The following have agreed to serve as chairmen and secretaries :

<i>Subject</i>	<i>Chairman</i>	<i>Secretary</i>
Anglo Soviet Relations	Victor Gollancz	Wright W. Miller
Anglo American relations	R. W. G. Mackay	Betty Wallace
International Economic Reconstruction	E. F. M. Durbin	Patricia Robertson
France	W. Pickles	Irene Roussin
Germany	Rennie Smith	Evelyn Cowley
International Authority		Cardiff Fabian Society

The committee of European socialists is nearing the end of its discussions, and a most interesting book on why democracy failed in Europe, and the lines of socialist reconstruction after the war, is taking shape.

Our panel of foreign speakers is much in demand, from organisations all over the country, and we feel that these lectures will contribute greatly to a more general understanding of the international problems which will confront us at the end of the war.

DEMOCRACY AFTER THE WAR

Louis de Brouckère

We cannot yet pretend to know what will happen after the war, and those who tell us how hopeless it is to make definite plans for the uncertain situation which will then prevail are largely right. Nevertheless there is not a single one among us who is content to leave it at that. We cannot afford to wait and see.

We have two very clear and important duties to perform. The first is to know our own minds, to know what we want irrespective of circumstances, to know the direction in which we would lead events if we could have our wish. We must see our goal clearly, or, in other words, we must know our aim in life.

We have yet another duty, as plain and as imperative : we must be prepared to struggle for our goal whatever may be the situation after Hitler is defeated. We must find out how best to work for the realisation of our ideals in the various situations which we can foresee and we must imagine as many of these as possible. Of course what will really happen will always be different from what

we have assumed, but the greater the number of cases investigated, the easier it will be to solve the new problems.

What is our aim? I for one can state what I want in three words: *Liberty, Democracy, Socialism*. And for me, these words do not refer to three different things, but are three names for the same God.

LIBERTY AND DEMOCRACY

Let me explain this briefly. If I had to define Liberty I would say: It is the right and the power for man or woman to make of him or herself the best, the most harmoniously developed personality it was in his or her nature to become. You can help people to develop themselves, but you can't do it for them. Socrates taught us that one can't put a really new idea into somebody else's head, but can only help that person to be delivered of his intellectual fruit by a sort of midwifery which he called *mayeutic* and which we call education. Just in the same way one has to develop oneself by one's own work, one's own will and one's own originality.

The right and power to do so is *Liberty*. But it is also *Democracy*. Why? Simply because real Freedom can only exist in Society, that is, in association, in cooperation, for in that way only can one be protected from Nature and one's fellow man.

Thus Liberty spells rules, law, and to some degree prohibition. Isn't your Magna Carta made out to a large extent of prohibitions? And when that arch liberty called leisure is guaranteed to the workers is it not by a law forbidding the employer to make his employee work more than eight hours a day, or forty hours a week?

Of course all laws, all prohibitions, are not liberty. Liberty results only from the rules which remove as completely as possible all hindrance to free development. Those rules have to be discovered and recognised. They also have to be accepted; for only accepted rules are fully efficient.

Sometimes—in fact very often—when I speak of Liberty and Democracy, I see people smiling: they find it out of fashion, too old. Old? In one sense it is as old as the human world. Croce, in his wonderful book, *History as the Story of Liberty*, tells us that since the origin of history all man's struggles, even in the so-called periods of reaction, are struggles for liberty, and that if history speaks of the past it is worth its name only in so far as it thinks of the future battles for liberty.

But in a sense Democracy is also very young, and remains eternally so. In fact it has not yet finished being born, any more

than the butterfly is completely born when it is still in the caterpillar stage. Have we yet achieved Democracy in the workshop or on the market? Have we Democracy in the household or in the schools? Have we Democracy in the Colonies or in the International world? Is settlement by world wars Democracy?

DEMOCRACY AND NATIONALISM

The only Democracy we have got, and in a very imperfect form, is *Democracy in the Nation*. And if a larger Democracy is our goal, it is inadvisable to start by destroying or restricting the only form of democracy which now exists.

Of course, Democratic Nations must be independent ones. That does not mean that they must have absolute sovereign rights. Absolute sovereignty is harmful, and stupid, and moreover impossible. Its true name is Isolationism. Many now say that small nations should not have these absolute sovereign rights. I would entirely agree, if only the word *small* was deleted, for sovereign rights are just as bad, if not worse, in big Nations as in small ones. Of course Belgium's isolationism was bad for the world, and for years I never ceased to say so. But wasn't the isolationism of the United States far worse, just because they were bigger, more powerful and more influential?

Just as men can only be free in social life, submitting to social rules, nations also have to live together and to submit to international law. But in the same way as the aim of Society is to develop individual personality, so the aim of a society of Nations must be not to destroy but to enhance national feeling and culture.

National feeling is strong just because it has come to life during a long and bitter fight against feudalism and absolutism, a struggle resulting in the development of parliamentary control, able to safeguard the fundamental rights of the subject against the old powers of the Prince and his courts and to become the executive machinery of the State.

Development of National control and National liberty means for each individual a great, a fundamental change. Instead of being like a herd of cattle, grazed for the benefit of the master, peoples become Nations, that is to say voluntary associations governing themselves. A Nation is made up of those who want to live together, who understand each other, who can be happy together, who have won together their first liberty and their first real feeling of human dignity.

National feeling is strong and cannot be destroyed. Even

centuries of war and tyranny cannot blot it out. Let me take Belgium as a case in point. For centuries we have been successively under the yoke of nearly all the great European powers in turn. Each tried, and tried hard, to assimilate us by flattery and by the sword. The country was time after time devastated, 'scorched'. Still national feeling remained and prevailed. What I have just said of my nation could be repeated for the majority of small nations, which were of course overrun much oftener than the big ones. In every one, national feelings survived the worst ordeals. In fact national feelings are not in proportion to the size of the country; they are not so much per square mile or per head. They are far more in proportion to the sacrifices which had to be made to achieve liberty. National feelings, even in small nations, cannot be sacrificed without serious dangers for peace, as all history proves.

THE FUTURE OF SMALL NATIONS

Moreover, is it true that small nations are out of date, no longer in accordance with the present needs of the world? What I clearly see is that the tendency of small nations to form associations grows steadily, but the same evolution appears in the policy of big nations and the driving power is the same in both cases. And the part played in world affairs by small nations, associated in Federations or in other forms of political organisations, seems to increase rather than to decrease.

The United States are a Federation of small States: only one, the State of New York, has a population larger than that of Belgium. The U S S R is not exactly a Federation, but a *sui generis* formation made up to a large extent of small nations, who very often struggle inside the Soviet Republic for greater independence, and succeed in obtaining it whenever external and internal circumstances favour a democratic development.

The British Empire has become the British Commonwealth. Here also small nations play an important part and each of them enjoys a remarkable amount of independence and even of sovereignty. Isn't that the real secret of British unity and of that wonderful strength shown by them during the present emergency? In fact, small Nations may have disadvantages, but they also have advantages. They bring the Government nearer to the citizens, make Democracy easier. And in spite of an opinion widely spread, they make international associations easier, as is shown by the experience of the League of Nations. Nearly all the steps taken in the right direction were those made by the Assembly, where there were representatives of all associated

Nations, great and small, in face of opposition from the Council where the Great Powers' influence was predominant.

INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

I consider it as all-important that after the war all Nations, even the smaller ones, should recover a real independence. But that doesn't blind me to the fact that when the time comes to build up the new peace we will be confronted by even more important democratic problems. We need international democracy. The only conceivable way of restoring peace is to organise a strong association—not necessarily a Federation—of free national states.

I said an association of free states. If the component states are not free in the fullest sense of the word, we will not have democracy on an international scale. I am somewhat frightened when I hear it said: let those nations who want to do so remain fascist, as Italy, or semi-fascist as Portugal. It reminds me of the attitude so often adopted in backward countries, where people say when a father beats his wife and children: Leave the family free to manage its own affairs as it thinks best. But the mother and the children don't want to be beaten; they just can't help themselves, and the millions of Germans and of Italians who are in concentration camps are in a similar situation. Don't say: We can't help it; it isn't our responsibility. Remember the grave warning given to the world by Roosevelt when he reminded us that Liberty will be safe nowhere if we let it be abolished anywhere. Liberty, like peace, is indivisible.

There can be no true international democracy without a real power of decision, and the old unanimity rule which prevailed in Geneva cannot be maintained in every case. I would be far more confident in the future of the world organisation if I saw in the international assemblies representatives of parliaments, elected by proportional suffrage, instead of mere representatives of Governments.

International democracy can only be built up on a world scale. If the most important of human affairs were to be decided by a mere fraction of humanity, it would almost inevitably be against the interests of the rest, and we cannot afford to let this happen. Of all the factors which led to the fall of the League of Nations, the most decisive one was the refusal of some States to adhere to the League. This time no effort should be spared to enlarge the scope of the League, to leave no important human community outside, to include the huge majority of them, not forgetting to include the smaller ones.

A universal association of Nations must have very large

powers. It must have supreme responsibility for the regulation of currency and credit, control of the distribution of raw materials, of migration and of transport. In the economic field it must preside over central planning. It must elaborate international law.

Of course regional international organisations are obviously just as necessary as an all inclusive League. The British Commonwealth is a case in point. Many parts of the essential World Society of Nations will probably belong simultaneously to other regional organisations. The post-war world will not be organised along simple geometrical lines, but will be as complex as life itself. We can't know exactly what form it will take. There are many possibilities for us to dwell on and I won't attempt to judge which of them is the most desirable. But I will say how fervently I hope that regional organisation will not lead to redistributing the world among three or four huge empires. That would necessarily lead, after a while, to renewed imperialistic competition and thus to war.

ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY

And now a few words about economic democracy.

We need organisation. But even more do we need liberty, and we are thus confronted by the difficult but necessary task of building up a free organisation. I simply cannot think of free organisation as being realised at its best by mere state control, and I am not happy when I am told that state control is Socialism as opposed to Capitalism.

The state is seldom opposed to capitalism. For centuries it was in fact the worst accomplice of capitalism. After the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century—and at that time capitalism was already very old—we had for something over a hundred years a capitalism over which the state had not entire control. But before that period, at least since the thirteenth century, in most of Western Europe capitalism manifested itself mostly as a permanent conspiracy between the prince and the moneylenders against the subjects, the neighbouring states, and later the coloured races. Capitalism had the same characteristics in the Roman Empire. Capitalism takes on more and more the same characteristics in Germany, in Italy, in an ever increasing number of countries, and to some extent in all countries. Nothing can be further from socialism than the kind of State capitalism promoted by the totalitarian dictatorships.

Some will ask: How can you avoid State capitalism if you are to get rid of capitalism in its present form? It is possible

that the world will go through a form of state absolutism during its fight against industrial feudalism, just as it passed through royal absolutism during its fight against military feudalism. It is possible that for some time, perhaps for a long period, liberty will be somewhat put in the shade. If I feel quite confident that the war will be ended by our victory, I am not so sure about the consequences of that victory. War seldom promotes liberty. The religious wars increased absolutism in nearly every part of the continent, and so did the victory over Louis XIV, except perhaps in France. The Napoleonic wars ended in the 'Holy Alliance', and after 1918 we had the worst forms of dictatorship, fascism and Hitlerism, and we have faced the most dangerous crisis in the socialist movement all over the world.

I do not forget how right the great Italian philosopher Croce was when he told us that history is always the history of liberty. In the long run, victory will help us to build up a new, a larger, a nobler liberty. But it may be only after a while and perhaps much later. And if for years or scores of years the notion of liberty is dimmed, shall we submit to that momentary trend of events? If we are to remain true socialists only one course is opened to us: fight at all costs for liberty.

Shall we fight for some impossible and foolish return to economic liberalism? Of course not, but for democratic economic control instead of State control. Can we give to that notion of democratic economic control some practical form based on experience? Have we something to propose? We have the huge experience of the cooperative movement, and the wonderful results of its newest forms in agriculture. We have the experience of the public utility services with representation and coordination of consumers' and producers' interests. We have the experience of the best forms of guild socialism, of trade union intervention in the discussion of labour conditions, of labour discipline and even of industrial management. We have also the experience of the intervention of workers' organisations in central economic control and in international legislation.

A century and more of workers' efforts and often of workers' successes have blazed a trail that we should follow. It leads to a really free world where workers will be happy at their work, where they will be proud of their labour freely executed, where men and women will be conscious of their individuality, of their rights and of their duties. Along this trail we will go towards a really civilised world, one in which William Morris would have been happy to live. To struggle for such a world is, in my opinion, the true aim, the true nature of socialism.

THE FUTURE OF GERMANY

P. Lamartine Yates

‘The central issue of this war, as of the last, is to decide what ought to be the place of Germany in Europe.’ These are the opening words of an important broadsheet recently issued by P.E.P. on the future of Germany which every socialist should read. The present moment, with no end to the war in sight, may seem inopportune for discussing how Germany should be treated when victory is won; yet unless we British people make up our minds now as to how we are going to behave towards the Germans, and unless we broadcast vigorously our intentions to them, we are depriving ourselves of one of the most potent weapons for winning the war. If the common people of Germany can feel assured of reasonable treatment when the fighting is over, they will be much less fanatical in defending their cause when they begin to suspect it to be hopeless.

CONDITIONS OF PEACE

The war will end in one of two ways: Allied victory or negotiated peace. Either we shall start with *tabula rasa* as a result of Germany’s military and/or economic collapse, or after years of indecisive warfare there may be a change of leadership in Germany sufficiently fundamental for us to be able to negotiate a peace without destroying our ideals. He would be a rash man who professed to know for certain which outcome is the more likely. For our present purpose it is better to assume the former alternative, since in that case the responsibility of the Allies will be greater and there are more questions upon which we must make up our minds. On the one hand there will be the problems of transition, of restoring normal life, organising relief, rebuilding ruined cities, re-equipping industry and agriculture; on the other hand and simultaneously there will be the long-term task of bringing Germany back into the comity of nations, fitting her politically and economically into the European framework whilst removing the possibility of her dominating weaker neighbours. Even in the case of a negotiated peace, though the tasks of transition might not arise in acute form, we should still be concerned with the long-term problem of Germany’s place in Europe.

REVENGE ?

Assuming a German collapse, what is to happen when the guns cease firing ? A few people still advocate the extermination of every German. Others, more moderate, suggest that the now oppressed peoples—Poles, Czechs, Norwegians and the rest—must be allowed to wreak revenge in full. It is only human to want to get one's own back, and the oppressed peoples certainly have many scores to pay off. Many of the Nazi overlords, Gestapo, S S and the like, deserve what they would get.

But can we afford to indulge our righteous wrath ? If we are going to leave the bulk of the German people alive and if we must have them as neighbours in perpetuity, we do not want bad neighbours. If we unleash the forces of revenge, and kill, starve or otherwise cruelly ill-treat many thousands of Germans, it will create such deep-seated resentment among the survivors that international co-operation will be poisoned from the start and we shall have sown the seeds of future wars. No ! When we have won, let that be the end of killing. Let the rule of law immediately replace the rule of force in our dealings with the enemy. Treat him harshly, if need be, but correctly, justly. We do not kick a man when he is down. It is worth remembering that on Armistice Day 1918 it was none other than Winston Churchill who in the teeth of opposition advocated sending six foodships to Hamburg.

OCCUPATION

If Germany collapses, there will have to be both military and civil occupation by the Allies. The allied armies will be needed to maintain law and order, for while the German armed forces and S S are being disarmed and unfrocked it is essential that separatist elements should be prevented from staging a Putsch. An allied civil administration will be needed to carry on the government of the country, for when the Nazi régime is swept away there will be no really representative political groupings ready to take over. The German people will need a substantial political breathing space before feelings are calmed and a General Election can be held.

The situation will be much more difficult than in 1918. Then there were parties, trade unions, workers' organisations and newspapers all in being : this time they will have been destroyed many years since. Then, the sweeping away of Kaiserdom had little effect on the lives of the masses ; this time the sweeping away of the Nazi party, which has insinuated its vile influence into every aspect of the lives of the German people, will leave a dangerous political and social vacuum.

These are the primary reasons why an occupation is necessary, and no effort should be spared to explain that to the German people. It will profit us nothing if we proclaim that we are marching in 'to teach them a lesson' or 'to make them feel they are beaten'. Indeed, if that spirit prevails, we shall lose the peace. Why not say quite simply that we come as doctor and nurse to heal a patient who has been run over and seriously injured.

It will probably not be long before the patient recovers and political groupings come forward which want to take over the government of the country. What is to be the attitude of the occupation forces? It will be precisely one of their primary functions to re-establish democratic self-government of Germans by Germans. This could probably very quickly be introduced in local municipal government and would gradually be extended. The capacity and reliability of a new upsurging movement would be put to the test by entrusting it with a job of local government and, if it proved its worth and gathered strength, it would rise to provincial and ultimately to national responsibilities. The military, who essentially have a conservative or even reactionary influence, might seek to suppress such a movement if it were led by progressives. That is why it is so important that the military should be subordinate to the civil occupying authorities.

Another possibility deserves consideration. Suppose that a revolutionary movement arises much earlier, shares in the overthrow of Nazism and is in *de facto* possession of the government of the country when the occupying forces arrive. Do the Allies depose that government on the grounds that Germany is not yet fit to choose her own leaders? Or do the occupying troops and civil authorities work with and through this new German government? If the former, at what moment would the Germans be judged 'fit to choose'? There is grave danger here of creating a situation analogous to the British Raj in India—a reiterated demand for self-government being always evaded and postponed. It must be the duty of socialist and workers' movements in allied countries to insist on a wise policy of occupation and to be on guard to prevent the growth of reactionary influences among the military forces. Occupation may be a necessity, but it is always a very double-edged weapon.

PRIDE AND PREJUDICE

In current talk one continually hears such phrases as 're-educating Germany for democracy', 'leading her back to mental health and psychological equilibrium', as if we British had a monopoly of virtue and wisdom. Circumstances have forced this

attitude upon us. We are fighting Nazism because it is an evil thing, and that in a sense includes the German people who by fair means or foul have been induced to support the régime. The whole welter of war propaganda which we imbibe necessarily oversimplifies the issues, exaggerating both our virtues and German wickedness. We are seeing everything through coloured spectacles. But when the war ends and our soldiers and administrators enter Germany they will need to be more modest and more realistic. We must say then to the Germans: 'We fought this war mainly to uphold principles of human decency which Nazism denied. But we are far from believing that you have a larger dose of original sin in your veins than ourselves. You came to believe in the perverse creed of Nazism as a result of historical circumstances, which, incidentally, we helped to shape. Nazism doesn't work; it is anti-social; it precludes the establishment of peaceful relations between nations; that is why we have insisted on making you give it up. But we as a nation have also believed in very anti-social things inimical to world peace. These beliefs must be given up too. We must both of us try to develop new ideas and a new attitude which shall promote international friendship rather than friction and strife.'

These sentences express, albeit very inadequately, something of the spirit in which we must approach the German people if we wish to win the double event—the war and the peace.

POLITICAL STRUCTURE

There remain to be discussed two questions—the future political structure and the future economic development of Germany, which although part of the phase of transition are closely related to the long-range task of setting up a new European framework.

Many people advocate carving up Germany into ten, twenty, fifty small independent States as she was a hundred years ago. Others think that Germany should be formed into a federation of States within a future European confederation. Such a solution could be but a temporary make-shift; it could not last against the will of the German people. Moreover, since the Germans so strongly desire to live together in one unitary State, and since the Allies are pledged to the principle of self-determination, would it not be wise policy to satisfy that desire provided it does not jeopardise the peace of Europe? And there is no reason why it should, if certain economic changes are made (see next section). Moreover, a unitary State is far more appropriate than a federal one for undertaking the planning which we socialists urge. What is needed in Germany is not more *self-government* in the provinces

or *Länder* but a more strongly developed tradition of *local* government—a central plan with decentralised administration responsible to local public opinion. For this the over-large province of Prussia should be split up, as the P E P broadsheet wisely suggests, into five or ten units each more comparable in size with the other administrative divisions in the Reich.

As for armaments, it has been laid down in the Atlantic Charter that Germany, while freely helped to economic recovery, is to be disarmed while the Allies 'do not repeat the mistake of last time' but remain armed to the teeth. In other words, we get the guns and Germany gets the butter, as the *New Statesman* aptly puts it. To pretend that Britain and France disarmed last time is a perversion of history. We did no such thing; up to 1933 either of us could have crushed Germany in a night. Indeed, precisely the fact that in the Peace Treaty the Allies were pledged to disarm and never fulfilled their pledge caused the most widespread resentment in Germany, a legitimate grievance on which the Nazis played.

This time let there be collective armed forces from the start. British tommies are not going to agree to police the continent for an indefinite period after the war; they will demand to go home and will insist on European garrison duty being shared by others. Nor will the British taxpayer consent to bear the entire burden of paying for Europe's armaments: to put it from a purely selfish standpoint, why should he alone make such a sacrifice of standard of living? For these reasons, if for no others, the future armed forces of Europe will have to be paid for internationally. If, for safety's sake, Germany is to be prohibited from producing any arms at all, even for international use, then other countries must at least agree for their part to abolish the private manufacture of armaments, bringing the industry under national control, and perhaps to submit to some form of international supervision of arms output. Even *The Times* advocates such a proposal (18.8.41): 'It would seem that some system of pooled and centralised control, not merely of armaments but of war potential, at any rate over certain areas of the world, will be ultimately essential.'

ECONOMIC DESTINY

What, under the circumstances, is going to happen to Germany's heavy industry which for years has been increasingly devoted to war production? It can of course be re-orientated from swords to ploughshares, from tanks to tractors, but the home market is far too small to absorb its output. There are not a few who argue that the over-development of this sector of German capitalism has been mainly responsible for Germany's exploitation of south-

east Europe and ultimately for her aggression. The danger of this happening again may perhaps be obviated in two ways. First, the German people are not likely to restore power to the big industrialists; by nationalisation or by other means they will insist on bringing key industries under public control. Secondly, the German problem must be considered within the wider framework of the new European and world institutions which it is hoped to establish. If the international lending of the future is to be undertaken through an International Bank and if foreign trade is brought increasingly under international supervision, there will remain little scope for the kind of economic aggression which German industry practised on her weaker neighbours.

But it was not only the industrialists who enjoyed excessive power in Germany. Equally it was the big landowners, the Junker politicians, who directed State policy in the direction of agricultural self-sufficiency, and not only thwarted the interests of the vast mass of German peasants who wanted cheap grain for fodder, but always identified themselves with the military caste. There can be no true democracy in Germany till their power is broken by the taking over of their estates either for land settlement purposes or to be run as collective farms leased from the State. Whether this expropriation of the landowners and big industrialists will take place swiftly and violently in a moment of revolution, or gradually and subject to due legal procedure, one cannot tell. If it has not already been accomplished by the time the provisional occupation government takes over control, it should form one of the first tasks of that administration: it cannot and must not be left until *after* self-government is restored to Germany, because only the elimination of these classes can ensure that the democratic forces shall not again be strangled by vested interests.

A natural counterpart to this will be the contribution which the British Labour movement can make in helping to re-create German trade unions and labour organisations. The German workers will need the utmost strength that organisation can give if they are to avoid being exploited during the difficult post-war period of transition. They will need not only fraternal moral support but money to re-start their trade union activities and their press. British socialists must seize on this opportunity, for every penny spent on building up a really strong working class movement in Germany will be an added insurance against a recrudescence of Nazism.

Finally, what about reparations? PEP recommend that the Germans be forced to forego 'a certain part of their potential income to export gratuitously machinery and equipment, just as

they are now foregoing it to export gratuitously bombs, torpedoes and crashed Messerschmitts'. This proposal is superficially attractive and will certainly receive wide support. Yet it is difficult to justify except as a measure of pure revenge. Reparation literally means 'making good damage done'; and one has a mental picture of the Luftwaffe being brought over to Britain to rebuild the houses they have knocked down. But by the time we have won the war there will most likely be more damage to repair in Germany than here; on that score it is we who should make reparation! Some people justify reparations as an expiation of war-guilt; but the exact allocation of responsibility for any war is a matter of great complexity, only possible after the lapse of years. It might, for instance, be argued that the USSR by making the pact with Germany helped to precipitate the war; is the USSR to pay reparations—and to whom?

A more immediate practical difficulty about reparations proposals is to find any country willing to receive substantial payments in kind, even of 'machinery and equipment'. Certainly the iron and steel industries of Britain and the USA will not welcome the idea of German deliveries in a period when they themselves are desperately trying to recapture lost markets on the continent and overseas. Perhaps the only country which would not be embarrassed would be the Soviet Union; to enrich the USSR however is not the prime intention of those who sponsor these proposals! No! A wise British government will resist all agitation for reparations. They are difficult to organise, they leave a nasty taste in the mouth and they have no moral justification.

CONCLUSIONS

A socialist policy towards Germany after the war may therefore be summarised as follows:

1. No revenge. Stern but just treatment of the vanquished, no condescension: no spiritual arrogance.
2. Military and civil occupation, the latter to be the controlling authority.
3. Gradual re-introduction of democratic self-government starting with local affairs.
4. Disarmament of Germany, but coupled with the organisation of collective armed forces for Europe.
5. Expropriation of anti-democratic forces—big industrialists and big landowners.
6. Revival and strengthening of trade unions and workers' organisations.
7. No reparations.

A PLAN FOR WALES¹

T. Alwyn Lloyd FRIBA

Past President of the Town Planning Institute

In view of the bold and farsighted proposals for National Planning that are now being voiced, it is reasonable to hope that, in common with her larger neighbours, Wales will succeed in obtaining an adequate measure of treatment of her special problems as a part of post-war reconstruction. This is necessary for practical, and not for merely 'nationalistic' reasons, because there is everything to be said for Wales herself working out her own contribution to the British Plan. Geographical and linguistic considerations, agricultural and industrial economy, social and educational traditions distinguish her in many essential respects from the rest of the United Kingdom.

CENTRAL AND REGIONAL PLANNING

Let us take it for granted that a Central Planning Board or Commission will be established for those major aspects of planning which are common to England, Scotland and Wales. The main channels of communication, the general principles to be followed for industrial location and the system of reservation for National Parks, are among obvious objectives that would come within this primary category. My own proposal would be that working in the closest collaboration with this British Planning Board we should have allied boards dealing specifically with England, Scotland, and Wales. In the past too much responsibility and too large a part in national administration have been centred in London. The recent Royal Commission stressed the dangers of the ever-growing concentration of industries and commerce in and around the metropolis; arguments for a policy of dispersal are almost taken for granted now, and if we are to have a healthy distribution of national resources for war and peace our National Plan must be founded on this underlying principle. For civil defence the Regional method, with wide powers devolved from the Ministries, has been followed. It is a valuable precedent.

In regard to national administration, there are many instances of devolution for Wales, notably in the additional powers delegated

¹ Acknowledgment is made to *Town and Country Planning*, in whose columns part of this article originally appeared.

to the Welsh Board of Health, including town and country planning and housing. In the duties assigned to the newer ministries, such as that of Works and Buildings, it is to be hoped that no attempt will be made to depart from this policy of devolution, but rather that any new powers will be combined with those existing in the Welsh Board of Health, or that an inter-related Planning Board be set up. Whatever machinery is devised, a Welsh division of the British Planning Board is essential.

I suggest that the following should be the main questions to which the Welsh Planning Board should devote attention :

(1) Transport, including communications by water, rail, road, and air.

(2) Regional distribution of water supplies, main drainage, electricity and gas.

(3) The future of agriculture—not as ‘the cinderella of planning’, but as one of the fundamental occupations on which the very life of the community depends. A national policy for afforestation is also essential.

(4) Replanning of towns damaged by enemy action, and of the older urban centres.

(5) Location of industry.

(6) The treatment of distressed (or ‘special’) areas.

(7) Establishment of new towns and trading estates.

(8) Future uses of wartime industries and of government establishments.

(9) ‘National Parks,’ coastal preservation and regional open spaces.

(10) Holiday resorts and tourist traffic.

(11) Regional organisation for detailed planning and for operative schemes.

Although these have been set out under separate headings, many of them are interdependent. The planned location of industry would, of course, have to concern itself with the ‘special areas’ and with decisions as to war establishments. Transport is closely related to all the issues referred to.

In the past it has been failure to decide on the best functions which localities can contribute to the national interest that has led to so much muddle and unseemliness in town and country. We must see to it in our National Plan that this is not repeated.

THE RESOURCES OF WALES

South Wales is pre-eminently an industrial and commercial region—collieries, steel, and other metal works, cement production, great ports and their ancillaries. In the eastern area, including

Monmouthshire, lives the greater proportion of the Principality's population, with the city of Cardiff and the County Boroughs of Newport on the eastern, Swansea on the western, and Merthyr Tydfil on the northern fringe. There is a considerable expanse of good agricultural land between these main centres, and a beautiful countryside near the seaboard. In the northern parts of industrial South Wales there is some of the best mountain and valley landscape, not as well known as it deserves to be. West Wales, the counties of Carmarthen, Pembroke and Cardigan, except for anthracite coal, tinplate and steel industries in the first-named, is essentially agricultural.

Pembrokeshire and Cardiganshire have most attractive coastal zones, fortunately to a large extent still unspoilt, and their permanent safeguarding under strict planning regulation must be one of our objectives. In Mid Wales there is a great expanse of fine country, a veritable paradise for ramblers.

North Wales is almost wholly agricultural in character and famous for its holiday and tourist attractions. There are 'pockets' of industry (collieries, steel works, brickmaking, etc) in the north-east, with slate quarries justly renowned for the quality of their products in Caernarvonshire and Merioneth. In some of the mountainous districts electric power and water schemes on a large scale have been developed.

Thus it will be seen from this brief description that the Principality contains much variety of scene and of function; the fact that so much of Wales is at present unexploited, and its proximity to the great centres of population over the border, point the need for much vigilance in regard to the future.

FINANCE AND LEGISLATION

The Plan for Wales would obviously have to cover the whole of the Principality, including Monmouthshire; we must ensure that no backward or poverty-stricken authority stands in the way of its execution. In North and West Wales there are several counties, as well as scattered individual authorities, that can hardly be expected to finance their own planning schemes, much less implement their provisions after preparation. The master plan is only possible on a national basis; Wales is certainly not too large a unit for this purpose, given the requisite machinery and the will to overcome doubts and difficulties.

The Town and Country Planning Act and its various regulations require drastic amendment and simplification; the whole troublesome procedure of compensation should be overhauled on the lines advocated in the recent reports of the Uthwatt Committee

and the Town Planning Institute. For the larger reservations, such as those to be secured along the extensive coast line of Wales and in the potential 'National Parks' areas, financial assistance from the Government will be required. These reservations will be enjoyed by countless thousands outside the localities themselves, and to a large extent outside Wales, so that the cost of keeping them free from sporadic building and from commercial exploitation should be shared on the broadest basis. We must also see to it that planning control is really effective from the outset, and that the vagaries of the 'interim development' period are avoided in future. Local, even regional, jealousies, which so often lead to frustration of the plan in detail, should not be tolerated. There will have to be a reasonable period for careful survey and research, in which local interests can have their say. So much depends on adequate preliminary investigation that this period should not be unduly hastened; in the course of it, the best brains of Wales should be called into consultation and research should embrace social and economic factors, agriculture, industry and commerce, local government, community-shaping and recreation, on as comprehensive a scale as this great opportunity offers.

BUILDING

Much tighter control over building proposals will be required than has been considered sufficient in the past, and this will apply to the re-planning of the older urban centres as well as to town extensions and to buildings in the rural districts. A system of licensing might be imposed, possibly in continuation of the war-time system, not of course with the object of curtailing building, as such, but to ensure its due regulation to the plan in regard to design as well as to siting. Supervision of design has been far too lax; indeed, the authorities are usually content to allow anything to go up that complies broadly with 'zoning' and building bye-laws. It should be made an obligatory condition that architectural advice should be sought by all planning authorities. For the remoter places, where such advice may not be readily available, I feel sure that the professional bodies, if appealed to, would readily devise procedure under which architects' services from elsewhere would be placed at the disposal of the authorities.

'SPECIAL' AREAS

Any Plan for Wales which does not grapple with the peculiar problems of the 'special' areas will fail in one of its primary purposes. Coal is, and is likely to remain, of supreme significance in our industrial framework, and means will have to be found to

rehabilitate the mining valleys, in which there is such fine human material as well as technical resources available. More intensified research will be required for the introduction of subsidiary industries and for the improvements of methods of extraction, transport and marketing. The export trade will need to be further investigated to create new markets for Welsh coal.

South Wales is well favoured geographically in the disposition of the colliery districts and ports, but the valleys are narrow and inconvenient for roads, housing sites, and public services. The report of the South Wales Regional Survey Committee to the Minister of Health as long ago as 1920 recommended that a policy of grouped housing estates and of dormitory town should be followed in the newer communities to accommodate the mining population, with accelerated transport facilities to and from their work. The report was not acted on, and much of the housing activity that ensued in spite of the depression was on wrong lines. That Committee's proposals, brought up to date and reinforced by the development of the present inter-valley main roads, should find a place in the National Plan. These new roads have brought into reasonable proximity to the main mining valleys new and less restricted sites at the northern ends. Near Pontypridd, at the southern end, the Treforest Trading Estate has been admirably laid out with Government assistance as a new industrial centre, but not as a complete township with housing and communal accessories. There is suitable land in the vicinity which could be planned to serve the future needs of the workers at the Trading Estate, and as a satellite to the nearby mining valleys.

NEW INDUSTRIAL CENTRES

In many parts of Monmouthshire and Glamorgan the importance of certain areas for war purposes has shown the need for comprehensive neighbourhood planning, improved communications and services. There will be many opportunities in these vicinities to make provision under planning powers for new or extended towns for the industrial population.

The future use of these many new industrial centres in Wales must receive careful attention after the war. It would be nothing short of a tragedy if, with so large an expenditure of public funds, they are allowed to become derelict or are sold for little more than scrap value, when the immediate purposes for which they were created have happily passed. Means should be devised for peacetime use of these well equipped centres, either as government factories or as trading estates under public control, with their environs properly laid out in new housing estates, with the necessary communal facilities and with agricultural belts on the periphery.

AGRICULTURE

It cannot be too often stressed that more weight should be given to planning for permanent agricultural as well as for industrial development. We are fortunate in Wales in having at the University Colleges some of the best known research departments in regard to plant breeding and a better use of the soil, as well as in other aspects of farming technique. We should take full advantage of all this in our schemes for the future of the countryside. For instance, the systematic planting with suitable grasses and rootcrops of the upland waste areas would add much to our potential farm acreages. Thousands of acres of our most fertile soils have been sacrificed to urban and 'ribbon' encroachment near the main roads. There have also been innumerable cases, some of the more glaring in Wales, where Government activities have resulted in especially good agricultural land being put out of cultivation.

The uncertainty of tenure for farm lands near the urban centres has interfered with those long-range programmes of production on which agriculture must rely. It is not unreasonable to anticipate a keener demand for agricultural holdings and settlements after the end of the present war, and this must be planned for. One aspect, carried out in relief of unemployment in Wales, has already passed the experimental stage and is capable of considerable expansion—the co-operative farm settlement. By conducting operations on a large scale, with cooperative buying and selling under expert managements, these settlements have already proved their value in production of essential foodstuffs. They have provided permanent employment under good conditions in new rural villages, and have shown that fresh produce can be supplied economically in the Welsh towns, saving in carriage and time compared with the previous supplies from long distances.

A policy for afforestation is urgently necessary as part of the national plan, and not as a separate scheme cutting across conservation of beautiful landscape.

NATIONAL PARKS AND HOLIDAY RESORTS

Space only permits a brief reference to other aspects of the National Plan. The holiday resorts are valuable assets, especially on the North Wales coast and its mountainous background: planning schemes must provide for the best development of these resorts. Many of them are badly laid out and unattractive as towns—it is the beauty of their natural surroundings that gives them importance. Far too much poor development has been permitted, including the collections of shacks and flimsy camp

quarters with which we have grown so familiar. The increasing popularity of the 'holidays with pay' movement will create a demand for greater accommodation in these holiday places. It will require all our efforts to see that the accommodation is provided in a seemly manner; in well designed holiday camps and orderly bungalow settlements that do not disfigure the landscape.

Several parts of Wales have been suggested as National Parks, the principal one being Snowdonia. Something in that direction has already been done, and the Caernarvonshire County Planning Scheme which embraces a good part of Snowdonia will doubtless do much more in safeguarding this splendid Welsh heritage.

The Pembrokeshire coast is another potential Park ('National Reserve' is a much better term) and progress has already been made through the County Planning Scheme in securing reservation for one important part of that attractive coastline. But so much of the lesser known seascape, mountains, and valleys of Wales may be vulnerable to thoughtless exploitation that we must ever be watchful to see that it is fully protected by planning control.

There is likely to be a big after-war programme of rehousing, town extension and village improvement. Some Welsh areas have suffered badly from war damage and timely opportunities have arisen for rebuilding on modern principles. Central open spaces, urban amenities, better street lay-out and siting of houses are required in all these towns. Nor must we forget the need for 'green belts' surrounding them.

COMMUNICATIONS

The improvement of communications would require an article to itself; all one need say here is that the National Plan should embody all the arterial road proposals and bypasses which the Ministry of Transport have projected. There are many desirable schemes to be incorporated in the plan that have not yet been considered for bettering facilities for through traffic, particularly from South to North Wales. At present the trunk roads connecting these extremities go outside Wales for the greater part of the route, and in consequence are longer than they should be. A new trunk road from the south, through Central Wales, to the north, is one of the reforms to be aimed at.

A new artery that is badly needed to bring the South Wales industrial areas into more direct contact with London, Bristol and the West of England is a road bridge over the Severn Estuary. This proposal was submitted to Parliament some years ago, but defeated by the opposition of various interests, which should not be allowed to stand in the way of so important a national scheme.

TOWN AND COUNTRY IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The Rev. W. Drury

It has always been the custom, says Mr J. Sullivan in the Winter 1940 *Fabian Quarterly*, to point to our system of local government as one of the outstanding features of British democracy. 'Our series of local authorities, guided and financially assisted by the central government, but essentially independent, self-governing, and consisting of democratically elected councillors, has stood out in sharp contrast to the centralised continental systems of local government.'

This is true, but, linked with this feature, is another which stands out in equally sharp contrast with the continental system, though it has not been advertised with the same complacency, namely, the separation, for local government purposes, of town and country in England. This has proved to be an effective counter-stroke to self-government.

Just as a residence usually stands in its own garden, as a farmstead serves its surrounding fields, as a great estate grows round a hall, a bishop's see is in the centre of his diocese, and a kingdom consists of capital and dependent provinces, and any living unit has a nucleus inseparable from it, so we should expect a township to include the rural area in which the town grew. Such an idea is entirely contradicted in English local government. Its principle is the separation of urban from rural areas by the institution of distinct authorities, and the drawing of the boundary between them at the very verge of the built-up area. The principle is, in fact, that of isolating the towns, where, in the absence of the feudal power, self-government has its greatest significance.

Nine-tenths of the area of England and Wales is still under Rural District Councils. That means that the four-fifths of our population living in urban areas exercise the power of local government over one-tenth of the area only. The overwhelming high value of land in the towns is a measure of the importance of their problems. It is of course a scarcity value and would be much reduced by rational town-planning, which however would necessitate the extension of the powers of urban authorities to land which is now administratively rural. The towns, to a number which is not easily estimated since some of the 960 odd urban areas adjoin each other, lie like islands in the rural ocean, a rural district often

lapping round and enclosing several towns. There is no marriage of town and country in England.

FEUDAL FORTRESSES

The origin of this separation is difficult to gather because the anomaly does not seem to have impressed any of the learned writers on local government. It looks as if the frontiers which have for so long been fixed at the outskirts of the towns represent the fact that though it has been impossible for the multiplication of the towns to be resisted, the agrarian interest has always been stronger than the industrial, and has needed to surrender no more land than has actually been built on, and has maintained a prestige by making such surrenders under the form of 'charters' granted to the towns, they having no prescriptive right to any margin of power. In 1834, in the era of reform, under the influence of Bentham, the new poor-law areas were made to include the market town with the country, but in the following year the Municipal Corporations Act showed the reaction by restoring the 'historic' boundaries of the towns.

The fact is that while the continent of Europe has responded to the rise of industrialism by making the city the centre of government and is now proceeding to the stage of proletarian revolution unhampered by feudal survivals, England has not yet achieved her bourgeois revolution. The curious arrangement of boundaries is not the result of any settlement but is the mark of a struggle which with us is always proceeding. The County Councils, controlling ancient feudal divisions of the country, maintain a successful fight against the extension of the County Boroughs which have been cut out of their area, while within the county the same success is achieved by the Rural District Councils against the extension of the areas of the Urban District Councils. The County and Rural District authorities appear to have possessed the ear of Parliament and of the officials in the ministries. The urban populations, like armies robbed of the power of manœuvre, could not even with the best counsels improve their position, do not secure the best councillors, and therefore lack the initiative to claim their full rights which might be expressed as, *All power to the boroughs*. To me it seems obvious enough that a town's frontier should be the frontier of the neighbouring town, and that there is no need for a rural authority to intervene. I have however searched in vain for such a suggestion.

It seems as if the relation of the town to the country was only imperfectly understood as yet in England. The farmer regards the town as a place where he can easily buy his agricultural

requisites and sell his products, and for the rest it is a concentration camp for those that are no use in the only form of production he is familiar with, a form which correctly impresses him as being fundamental and vital. But he does not always realise the extent to which his industry is dependent on town products. His requisites have to be produced by intricate methods in the mass or he could never receive them, and his products are of no use until they are distributed. The price he gives for the one and gets for the other is dependent not on the mere existence of a servile population but on a disposition of effort quite as exacting as his own and not subjected to the same unified control. The production of his requisites and the distribution of his products are part of the agricultural cycle, the beginning and the end of it in fact, and he is unfortunately the central link and liable to be frustrated in his prices by any mismanagement in the town—e.g., by congestion.

It is therefore most important that farmers should sit on councils in towns. The townsmen themselves are largely middlemen to whom it matters little what the price of agricultural requisites or produce is, as they work on the turnover.

TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING

But the production of the farmer's requisites and the distribution of his products is affected directly by the policy of constricting the boundaries of the town. Thus treated a town cannot avoid becoming a network of streets along which passage will be difficult and, much worse, a network which will cut up the manufacturing and commercial areas into sites too small for massed production and the distribution of large bulks of the farmer's produce. Without the space of the countryside surrounding it, a town cannot be redeemed from this kind of congestion. We call for town-planning forgetting that the custom has been for no new area to be added to a town until it can be claimed that it is already urban, that is, until it has been built up under the irresponsible eye of a rural authority. This policy has apparently been modified to some small extent in the most recent revision of boundaries, but when we remember that our leading town-planner, Professor Abercrombie, has said that ribbon development is natural, and therefore realise that ribbon development only requires to be purged of certain faults, which are not inherent, to give the town its naturally elongated shape that secures it against congestion, it will be realised that no mincing measures will do, but that the town needs to run through the country, and for that purpose the unitary district must consist of town and countryside.

The absurdity of having a separate rural authority sitting

in a town in which it has no jurisdiction is seen at once in more immediately practical matters when a national crisis like the present one occurs. It was obvious that local government of this kind would break down in wartime, or rather that its farcical nature would be revealed at any time when it was necessary for local government to become a reality, and therefore regional commissioners were appointed in good time with full power over town and country in local affairs. On the outbreak of war rural councils were easily persuaded to resign their powers to emergency committees which then rather cynically began cooperating with the town authorities. Even then all was not well, for when a town like Plymouth was bombarded and the people took to the hills, the mayor had to inform them that when they left the town the authorities could no longer be responsible for them.

THE WAY OUT

How can this state of affairs be improved? There is neither the knowledge nor the spirit in the beleaguered towns to demand a national solution. It is more likely that, in certain counties at any rate, a change will be effected indirectly by the growth of a demand for self-government within the rural areas.

The rural areas suffer from a disability of a different nature from that of the towns but brought about ultimately by the same cause. Whereas the urban areas are too small for their populations, the rural areas are far too large for any sort of real self-government. The average size of a rural district is about a hundred and ten square miles. Twelve miles, the diameter of a circle this size, is too great a distance apart for councillors to possess a common knowledge of the circumstances governing the discussion of local questions. The Rural District Council is also too ponderous a body for the detail that is involved in real self-government, and again, to keep its size within its present bounds only a few of the parishes can be given a representation of more than one member. (No doubt Mr Sullivan has the exception of the rural districts in mind when he says that almost every local authority in the country covers too small an area. But the number of the rural districts is about half that of the urban ones.)

With a growing population in many nominally rural districts as well as in the town areas, the demand for a share in local government has increased and spread among a class of rural citizens who have not the leisure or facility for travelling that the old class had, and smaller districts are required than were suitable at a time when only the well-to-do farmers took part in local affairs. But whenever this growing demand has reached a point locally at which

an area can claim to be urban and to be made independent of the rural district, it has been cut out from the district without the neighbouring parishes, and the rural district has not become appreciably smaller in area.

On the other hand, many of the parishes of which the rural district is composed are too small for much power to be delegated to them. A new formation, intermediate in size, is required, and the need has already been recognised in the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Local Government of 1923. A new formation has been regularised by the Local Government Act of 1933. But its adoption has been left to local initiative and its sufficiency has hardly yet been tested. This prospective formation is referred to as a Parochial Committee of the Rural District Council, and it can be made obligatory on that authority to appoint it by order of the Minister of Health on the application of one or more parishes. It is composed of Rural District Councillors, presumably those of the parishes concerned, and of members of the parish councils concerned. It is to have the services of the technical staff of the Rural District. Areas intermediate between the Rural District and the parish already exist in the wards from which County Councillors are elected.

The creation of Parochial Committees would be a reversal of the policy which has stunted the growth of our towns. The disintegration of the Rural District (which is already in decline, having surrendered practically all its powers except that relating to public health to the County Council) would remove the most powerful influence militating against the extension of the present urban districts, while the reintegration of the rural parishes into smaller districts would, when these unions were near a town, make cooperation easier between town and country, or, if an urban nucleus developed in a rural area, would make it unnecessary for space for orderly growth to be sacrificed in order to secure its independence of the rural district.

THE TRADE UNIONS AND THE WAR

John Price

Political Secretary, Transport and General Workers Union

What has been the policy of the trade unions during the war? What contribution have they made towards the war effort, and what have they done to promote the interests of their members and the workers generally? Were they swept off their feet by the outbreak of war, or did they have their plans ready? Is their war-time policy dictated by opportunism, or is it a continuation of the line they pursued in the past?

All these questions, and many others, occur to anyone who tries to understand the position of the trade unions in regard to the war. It is clear that they cannot be answered merely by considering what has been done and said during the war itself. Earlier events and decisions must also be taken into account.

THE STRUGGLE FOR STATUS

A great part of the history of trade unionism has been taken up by the struggle for status. The trade unions began life as illegal conspiracies. Combinations to interfere with wages and conditions of employment had been prohibited when the Tudor State attempted to regulate conditions by legislation. In the eighteenth century, under the changing conditions of the industrial revolution, the workers were driven to combine for their own protection, since the old system of State regulation had broken down. But the courts held that such combinations were illegal at common law because their objects were in restraint of trade, while Parliament expressly prohibited them, first in a series of separate trades and later by the Combination Acts of 1799-1800, which applied to industry in general.

In their early days, therefore, the trade unions had to carry on a struggle for the right to exist as legal organisations. This, however, was only the first stage. They wanted not only to exist but to function to the fullest possible extent. Having secured 'legal status' they then had to gain a number of other indispensable rights and to fight for recognition by Governments and employers.

Recognition by employers implied that the employers accepted the unions as being competent to speak for the workers and to

enter into agreements on their behalf. It meant, in other words, the recognition of collective bargaining. But the conclusion of collective agreements involved, in its turn, the establishment of regular machinery for the conduct of negotiations, the interpretation and revision of agreements, and the settlement of differences and disputes. Before the last war collective bargaining had been recognised in most of the big industries, though not in all.

GOVERNMENT CONSULTATION

Not all industrial questions are settled between employers and workpeople ; many are dealt with by Government Departments or regulated by legislation. The trade unions had therefore to induce successive governments to recognise their right to be consulted on all questions relating to labour and, indeed, to industry itself. Here, too, some progress had been made by 1914.

It was during and after the last war that the greatest strides were made towards recognition in this wider sense. As during the present emergency, the Government, the employers and the unions were obliged to consult together about the urgent and difficult problems of industry and labour. In order to secure the co-operation of the workers the Government had to give the unions broader rights and opportunities to influence decisions. The events of that period had permanent effects upon the trade union movement and the machinery for the conduct of industrial relations. Wartime experience brought home the need for a lasting improvement in the relations between the employers and the workers.

There followed a development in the voluntary machinery of negotiation. National joint industrial councils, conciliation committees, and arrangements for the settlement of disputes by agreement, were developed in one industry after another. Conditions in those industries were kept constantly under review by the employers and unions, instead of being discussed at *ad hoc* meetings when disputes were imminent. Consultations between employers' organisations and trade unions became more frequent.

Improvements likewise followed in the machinery for the regulation of wages and conditions of labour by authorities set up under Act of Parliament. When legislation affecting labour and industry was under consideration, it became the rule for the Government to consult the trade unions as well as the employers. Arrangements were also made for the unions to be represented on boards and committees set up to assist in the administration of such measures.

These rights and facilities were not secured without a struggle.

Right down to the outbreak of the present war the unions had pressed their claims to wider recognition and improved status, and had insisted on these rights of consultation and representation. In all these fields they had made considerable headway by the time the war broke out. Their policy of demanding to be consulted on the problems thrown up by the war, and to be represented on wartime councils and committees, is therefore a logical continuation of the line they have consistently pursued.

RESISTANCE TO AGGRESSORS

The trade union attitude towards the war has also been affected by pre-war events and decisions in the sphere of foreign affairs. In common with the Labour Party the trade unions had been pledged to a policy of disarmament, but this policy had to be revised to meet the dangerous situation created by the acts of aggression in China and Manchuria, Abyssinia and Spain, as well as the threat to world peace by Nazi Germany. For a long period before the war, therefore, the Labour Movement, while advocating the removal of the causes of war, was stressing the need for collective resistance to the forces of aggression. It held that the peace-loving Powers should be willing to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the dissatisfied States but should not yield to intimidation.

This new policy carried certain implications. One was that the Movement should take its part in resisting the aggressors if the need should arise. It could not call for a stand against aggression and then leave the resistance to others. A second was that if it wanted the peace-loving States to combine against the threat of intimidation it should help to build up the necessary armed force. Both implications were accepted.

During the year which followed the Munich Conference of 1938 the country was facing a threat of war. It was a period of armed truce. No one wanted to believe that war was inevitable, but none could escape the feeling that it was a distinct possibility. The Government began to develop civil defence services and to make plans for the running of industry in the event of a war breaking out. The Labour Movement, too, was obliged to take decisions on these matters, in the knowledge that any action they took would affect their position if war should come.

For instance, Labour councillors up and down the country had to say whether they would take part in the development of the civil defence services, and the trade unions were confronted with a similar question in regard to the national service committees. The overwhelming opinion in the Party and the unions was that

we should co-operate. Again, in December 1938, the General Council of the T U C were invited by the Minister of Labour to discuss with him the problem of the use of labour in time of war, and particularly the preparation of a list of occupations that would be essential to the country under the conditions of mechanised warfare. They agreed to take part in these discussions.

In May 1939, a few months before the war, a Special Conference of Trade Union Executives was held to consider what had been done. The Conference endorsed the action of the General Council and gave its approval to a plan on 'Labour in War Time'. As a result of all these decisions the unions were committed to support of the national effort in a war against aggression.

ORGANISATION FOR WAR

When the war started some people seemed to expect the workers to do what they were told and ask no questions. They resented the efforts of the unions to protect their members. The unions' endeavours in this direction were represented as a selfish attempt to take advantage of the nation in its emergency. There is no need to justify the unions' defence of workers, but it may be useful to point out that in addition to this function the unions have certain positive and constructive needs to fulfil. They are required to assist in the organisation of industry for war purposes and in settling the human problems thrown up by the wartime conditions.

The organisation of industry and agriculture for war is bound to involve a tremendous amount of adjustment and expansion. If this work is to proceed with a maximum of efficiency and a minimum of hardship the unions must take their part in it. But it is not only the machinery of industry that must be adapted; the workers too must adjust themselves to new conditions and grapple with new problems. To do so they need the help and support of the unions. The work done by the unions both in the sphere of industrial organisation and in that of human relationships is a positive contribution to the struggle for victory.

In all this work the unions must constantly bear in mind the problems of the return to peace. The needs of industry and of the workers after the war must be considered when wartime changes are made. The re-adaptation of industry to peacetime pursuits will bring its own difficulties of organisation and human problems too. It will not be a mere question of the restoration of conditions but of meeting the altered circumstances of a new world. That process must not be made unnecessarily difficult by the changes introduced during the war. Where possible, the changes

must be stages on the road towards the organisation of industry on Socialist lines.

Trade union policy during the war has been one of full support for the national effort, but the unions have both pressed for safeguards in the present situation and sought guarantees for the future. In pursuit of this policy they have continued to urge their claim to full recognition by the State. The decisions of the pre-war Conference of May 1939 were followed by the resolution of the Trades Union Congress on the day after Britain entered the war on the side of Poland. Congress resolved that everything possible must be done to defeat the aggressor. In May 1940, after Labour had entered the Government, another Special Conference endorsed the General Council's negotiations with the new Government, while the annual Trades Union Congress in October of that year reaffirmed the Unions' determination to carry on with the struggle. Both at that Congress and at the one held in September of this year, the consultations between trade union leaders, Ministers and employers were approved. They are a recognition of the unions' position in a democratic State.

LABOUR PROBLEMS

During the war the unions have had to deal with many great and difficult problems, affecting both industrial organisation and the well-being of the workers. There have been, for example, the problems of supply, man-power, training of new labour, the employment of women in industry and the avoidance of disputes and stoppages. The unions have helped to handle these problems in direct negotiations with employers and through their association with Government committees. They have co-operated in the work of the Ministry of Supply, at the centre and in the areas. They have formed part of the labour supply organisation of the Ministry of Labour and have helped with the work of the Minister's National Joint Advisory Committee and Joint Consultative Committee. Through these bodies they have assisted in the preparation of the schemes for the registration of workers, the training schemes and the Essential Work Orders. They have gone into the questions surrounding the wages, hours, holidays, protection and general welfare of women workers. And they have helped to work out provisions for the avoidance of stoppages of work through labour disputes.

Other problems have arisen in connection with wages, prices and the cost of living, the black-out, work during air raids, and work under wartime conditions of all kinds, the restoration of working rules and customs after the war, and the welfare of the workers in general.

GREAT OPPORTUNITIES

Wartime is a period of problems and difficulties. But it is something more than that, It is also a time of opportunity. The trade union movement is now being put to a severe test, and much will depend upon the way in which it responds. The war is providing trade unionists with opportunities for service, both nationally and in the localities. It is giving them facilities for acquiring knowledge and experience in the running of industry and the conduct of public business. It is bringing them into spheres in which they can exert increased influence upon opinion. By their use of these opportunities the unions will still further justify the position they occupy in the community.

In the midst of this terrible struggle we constantly turn our eyes to the future. It is for the sake of the future that the war is being fought. How will it end? What is it all about? One thing is clear: as far as the trade unions and the Labour Party are concerned, our aims in this war, however we express them, are the aims for which we fought in time of peace. We are fighting for victory against dictatorship and aggression because we believe that victory will make it easier for us to go forward with the building of the new world to which our Movement has always aspired.

NOTES ON BOOKS

Home Affairs

CARRY ON LONDON! by Ritchie Calder (English Universities Press 5/-)

A straightforward account of the way in which the people of London stood up to the Luftwaffe. Even more encouraging is the story of how the common people learnt for the first time what democracy can mean and how it should be used. The initiative and resource of unknown citizens cut through official inertia and actually led the Government in its counter-measures. They did it 'because they thought they ought to' J. A.

EDUCATION TODAY By John Dewey (Allen & Unwin 5/-)

A reprint, with a foreword, of six articles by 'the leader of the progressive forces in American education', dated 1897, 1898, 1901, 1901, 1908, 1908. The most interesting point about them is the extent to which, as they show, American ideals of democratic education, possibly because of the lack of class in the American system, has anticipated our own. Professor Dewey's articles of thirty and forty years ago are well worth study by English educationists of today. M. I. C.

HOSPITALS UNDER FIRE Edited by George C. Curnock
(Allen & Unwin 7/6)

How the hospitals came off in the blitz. 32 excellent photographs. But incidents involving great courage and resource fall flat unless written by someone who understands the use of words. None of these stories reach a very high standard, but the best are those which I imagine were taken down by a reporter from one of the people present at the time and are therefore direct and authentic, and not distilled through a literary filter. J. A.

BRITISH TRADE UNIONISM by Allen Hutt (Lawrence & Wishart 2/6)

A most interesting and readable introduction. It summarises the main trends in British trade unionism and criticises the right wing leadership in recent years with effect. But it fails to explain the weaknesses in the left wing which prevented it taking over the leadership.

The chapter on the present war is the most important. But it is disappointing since it does not point clearly to an alternative line. A call to the Unions to make this war a revolutionary war would have been a fitting conclusion. P. R. P.

THE CAMBRIDGE EVACUATION SURVEY Ed. by Susan Isaacs
(Methuen 8/6)

An excellent survey so far as it goes. The main and most interesting material is an intensive study of 700 children from the boroughs of Tottenham and Islington. It is significant for a permanent social and educational policy that neither the economic status nor the intelligence quotient of a child was found important for successful billeting.

The problem of an evacuation policy that would give stability is simplified rather unsatisfactorily by ignoring 'mothers and babies', including children of pre-school age. Even so, the recommendations made are eminently sensible and should prove very welcome to teachers and administrators. J. H.

EDUCATION FOR THE PEOPLE by F. H. Spencer, late LCC Chief Inspector of Education (Routledge 7/6)

A very sensible, readable, and practical book by a man of wide experience, historical knowledge and strongly liberal views. It includes a survey of the past as well as proposals for the future, and no one who is thinking about educational reform should miss it. M. I. C.

ECONOMIC TRIBULATION by V. C. Vickers. (John Lane 5/-)

Earnest confusions of a monetary reformer with an oratorical style. One of a number of books that begin with 'Christian principles' and end with 'stabilization of the wholesale price level,' but shorter and more modest than most. Its author was a director of Vickers Limited for 22 years and of the Bank of England for nine. Published posthumously. R. C. T.

International

BEHIND THE NAZI FRONT by John McCutcheon Raleigh (Harrap 10/6)

REPORT ON ENGLAND by Ralph Ingersoll (Bodley Head 7/6)

I WAS ONE OF THEM by Zygmunt Litynski (Cape 10/6)

Three pieces of reportage of the war. Ralph Ingersoll, editor of P M, came to England for a fortnight in September 1940 to see for himself. His most sensational—and most doubtful—statement is that in the beginning of September Hitler had won the war and didn't know it. Otherwise a good piece of fresh reporting on London in the Blitz. Behind the Nazi Front, by another American journalist, whets the appetite, but is rather thin reading. The information given relates almost entirely to the first year of the war, and mostly to the first winter; and though it may be heartening to learn that Berlin was

terrified by its first air-raid warnings, that ration cards were very annoying, and that Berliners were very cold during the winter of 1939, it all seems rather far away now. There is some interesting reportage on Czechs and Poles.

The best of the three is the contribution of a Polish journalist turned French soldier, who fought at Narvik and in the Battle of France, and finally escaped via Spain to Lisbon and England. After a dullish opening, his description of the dreary days of waiting for war to start, of the Norwegian fighting, now so little remembered, and of the fall of France, are vividly interesting. His opinions are worth listening to, and the book is excellently translated, though a map or two would have been welcome.

M. I. C.

FOUNDATIONS OF VICTORY by Lord Davies (Collins 2/6)

A vigorous re-statement of much that has been said before in various quarters on responsibility for the war and on the democratic way to prosecute it successfully. Some of it has become obsolete with subsequent events—Russia's resistance to invasion (which may have modified the author's rather unsympathetic attitude to that country), and the Atlantic Declaration (itself perhaps an answer to the general demand for War Aims of which this book is a notable part). The most interesting chapter concerns a post-war international authority. Lord Davies' recommendation of a 'new order' built up in stages over a period of years is soundly reasoned, and few will disagree with his proposals for an English-speaking union. He advocates a United States of Europe to exclude Britain—mistakenly, I believe, for Britain must be party to any European union which is to be politically and economically effective. One would welcome clearer distinction between 'federation' and 'confederation'. (Was not the League a "confederation"?) But it would be reassuring to know that this book has been or will be read by some of the wishful thinkers whom Lord Davies accuses.

T. C. H.

IRELAND, ATLANTIC GATEWAY by Jim Phelan (Bodley Head 3/6)

A useful, interesting work, though Mr Phelan wrongly believes the I.R.A. progressive, the Catholic Church pro-British, the Border unimportant, and America completely sympathetic to Eire. The needed attack on the ranchers whose 'friendship' is so dangerous to us, and the account of Eire's links with Denmark and the Nazis' care not to inform the Irish of their suppression of Danish farmers' co-operatives, are valuable. Unfortunately the book was written before Russia entered the war; also it treats the economic blockade of Eire as a threat instead of a fact.

J. H.

UNION NOW WITH BRITAIN by Clarence K. Streit (Cape 7/6)

In his latest book Streit brings his proposals for Federation in line with current events by confining his argument to the support of an immediate Union of Britain and the United States. His revision, however, still fails to take into account the fact that, although Americans laugh at British democracy (with some justice), the American Constitution, which Streit advocates as the Constitution of his proposed Union, is such as to baffle completely anyone who tries to implement the theory of democracy under it. It becomes clearer every day that the problem is a world wide one, and the goal of world peace will not be achieved by the adoption of *ad hoc* schemes, incapable of ultimate wider application.

R. W. G. M.

THE LAST YEARS OF THE ENGLISH SLAVE TRADE by A. Mackenzie-Grieve (Putnam 15/-)

A chatty, rather amateurish book about Liverpool trade, the Guinea captains, the Abolitionists, the founding of Sierra Leone, etc. Brightly written, with amusing original material; but could have done with better arrangement and less discursiveness.

M. I. C.

